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Trans-Tasman Triangular Taxation Relief 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In March 2002 the finance ministers of New Zealand and Australia released a 
joint discussion document on trans-Tasman triangular taxation.  The proposals 
represented are a significant step towards addressing one of the major taxation 
barriers to trans-Tasman investment.  The discussion document invited 
interested parties to present submissions by 3 May 2002.  This article 
examines: 
 
?? The origins of triangular taxation. 
?? The merits of the New Zealand and Australian government’s joint 
proposal (called “The Pro rata Approach to Triangular Taxation”).   
?? An alternative solution. 
?? Ad hoc solutions. 
 
From the perspective of trans-Tasman individual shareholders, the pro rata 
proposal is an improvement compared to the current position, but it is not the 
optimal solution. From their perspective the most tax effective option is what is 
known as the “full streaming” solution.  However both governments are 
concerned about the fiscal risks of the streaming alternative and the fact that it 
might signal a greater acceptance of streaming which is not the case.   
 
WHAT IS TRIANGULAR TAXATION 
a) Introduction 
A triangular investment occurs when an investor resident in Australia or New 
Zealand invests in a company resident in the other jurisdiction that earns 
income and pays tax in the investor’s home jurisdiction.  When these investors 
receive dividends they are unable to obtain a credit for tax that has been already 
been paid in their home country.  This results in triangular income being taxed 
twice;  in the country in which it is derived and again in the hands of the 
investor.  This is a major disincentive to trans-Tasman investment and has led 
to the development of structures to circumvent the problem. 
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b) From a New Zealand shareholder’s perspective triangular taxation can 
occur in the following scenario 
 
 New Zealand  Australia 
 
 
 
 
  Capital Flow 
 
 Effective 
 Investment 
 
 
 
 Capital Flow 
 
 
 
 
 
Diagram 1:  Triangular investment 
 
c) Triple Taxation 
For simplicity the following calculations assume a 30% tax rate in both 
Australia and New Zealand. 
 
  
Table I: Triple Taxation 
New Zealand Subsidiary Company % 
Profit 100 
NZ Company Tax (21) 
Dividend 79 
Non-Resident Withholding Tax @ 15% [FITC] (12) 
Cash Dividend to Australian Parent 67 
Australian Parent Company % 
Cash Dividend 67 
Australian Tax  
Australian Non-Resident Withholding Tax @ 15% (10) 
Cash Dividend Paid to NZ   57 
New Zealand Individual Shareholder % 
Cash Dividend 57 
Personal Tax on Grossed-up Dividend @ 39% (26) 
Less Credit for NRWT (10) 
After Tax Available Cash 41 
EFFECTIVE TAX RATE 59% 
Aust Co 
NZ Sub 
NZ Investor 
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The effective tax rate is 59%.  The problem summarised in Table 1 is a serious 
issue for any New Zealand individual shareholders who own shares in two of 
the leading Australian financial institutions which play a significant part in the 
New Zealand financial market, namely the ANZ Banking Group, and the 
National Australia Banking Group (which purchased the BNZ1). 
 
The common theme which underlines Diagram 1 and Table 2 is the unique 
nature of trans-Tasman investment.  A parent company is owned by 
shareholders on both sides of the Tasman.  Secondly, the parent company owns 
an operating subsidiary on the other side of the Tasman.  Thirdly, the operating 
subsidiary is paying full local corporate tax.  Fourthly, the dividend paid by the 
subsidiary to its parent company is usually not subject to non resident 
withholding tax (NRWT).  Finally, the dividend derived by both groups of 
shareholders does not contain a tax credit for the corporate tax paid by the 
operating subsidiary.  It is one of the ironies of the closer economic relations 
(CER) agreement that any “local” parent company who wishes to become an 
Australasian player will reward its shareholders with a punitive tax bill that is 
totally inconsistent with CER. 
 
d) A hypothetical example of a New Zealand company 
 
The seriousness of this problem is illustrated by what would happen if a 
hypothetical New Zealand brewer expanded into Australia.  Let us assume that 
Lager Limited is a company paying New Zealand company tax at 33 percent 
and that it pays a fully imputed dividend to, inter alia, its individual New 
Zealand shareholders.  Assume that Larger Limited is also producing beer for 
export into a highly competitive global market.  The company identifies an 
opportunity in the Australian market.  It merges with an established Australian 
beer manufacturer to exploit that opportunity.  To fund the merge a new parent 
company (Super Lager) is formed which is listed on the Australian and New 
Zealand stock exchanges.  As is so often the case, the parent company is based 
in Australia and the original New Zealand shareholders now hold shares in 
Super Lager.  Despite the fact that the merger was fundamental to the long term 
viability of both the pre-merger companies and the clear benefits to the 
respective national economies, the New Zealand shareholders are rewarded 
with an increased tax liability from 33 percent to 59 percent.  This occurs 
despite the fact that the same amount of New Zealand company tax is still paid 
and the New Zealand shareholding remains intact.  Clearly something is wrong 
with both countries tax systems. 
 
                                            
1 Two financial institutions have sought to overcome this problem via the floatation of a separate subsidiary.  In the 
Inland Revenue Department’s Technical Information Bulletin (TIB) the details of the recent $800 million Westpac 
float are outlined, (IRD TIB Volume 11 No 10 (November 1999) pp7-12). 
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The New Zealand resident shareholders can argue with considerable 
justification that local New Zealand tax should be able to be attached to 
dividends paid to inter alia resident individual New Zealand shareholders. 
There is a prima facie case for arguing that such an outcome is consistent with 
the objectives of New Zealand imputation system.  It is important to note that 
the New Zealand shareholders are not asking for any credit to be given to them 
for the Australian company tax paid by Super Lager.  Their case is based solely 
on the fact that there is local tax paid, there are local shareholders and there is 
no apparent reason for preventing those shareholders receiving an imputation 
credit for the local company tax. 
 
THE NEW ZEALAND TAX SYSTEM 
a) Imputation Regime 
 
Diagram 1 identifies a problem which only arises when a New Zealand or 
Australian company derives income sourced from the other country. 
 
In the case of a domestic New Zealand company which does not derive any 
foreign sourced income, the tax paid at the company level is attached (imputed) 
to the after tax dividend paid to the New Zealand resident shareholder.  The 
imputation credit and the cash dividend are included in the shareholder’s gross 
income, and subject to tax at the shareholder’s marginal rate.  The shareholder 
claims the company tax as a credit against their personal tax liability.  
Depending on the shareholder’s marginal rate, this will either result in 
additional tax to pay (39% marginal rate), no extra tax to pay (33% marginal 
rate), or a “refund” (19.5% marginal rate) of the surplus imputation credit of 
13.5% in the form of a tax loss.  Clearly the company’s income is only taxed 
once. 
 
Table 1 demonstrates how the New Zealand imputation system applies when 
inter alia a foreign parent company is interposed between the New Zealand 
resident shareholder.  The key point to note is that the company tax paid by the 
New Zealand subsidiary does not create any imputation credits for the ultimate 
New Zealand individual shareholders.  This outcome is no accident of history.  
It was a deliberate policy choice when New Zealand introduced a full 
imputation regime.   
b) Tax havens 
New Zealand officials have consistently adopted the view that one effective 
method of preventing a New Zealand resident company from changing its tax 
residence to a tax haven would be to create a significant tax cost for its New 
Zealand resident individual shareholders.  This concern was adopted by the 
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report of the Consultative Committee on International Tax Reform Part I 
March 1988.  The Committee explicitly stated there is a need: 
 
“to discourage resident companies from ‘going offshore’, by 
penalising their New Zealand resident shareholders …  
Furthermore, the tax advantages are not one sided since the 
restructured company would lose the ability to pass imputation 
credits for New Zealand tax paid through to its resident 
shareholders.  In addition, non-resident dividend withholding tax 
on dividends paid out of New Zealand and dividend withholding 
payments on income dividends might also be incurred.”2 
 
In April 1988 the same Committee issued their report on Full Imputation.  A 
similar concern was noted at pages 53-54 of that report.  After acknowledging 
that there was a clear link between the international tax regime and imputation, 
the Committee referred to submissions which argued that a non-resident 
company should in certain circumstances be able to pass on imputation credits 
for tax  paid in New Zealand to its New Zealand shareholders.  The Committee 
was referring to a scenario which has since occurred in the banking industry.  
The Committee noted that from an imputation perspective, there is no policy 
reason to prevent for example NAB/BNZ passing imputation credits on to its 
New Zealand resident individual shareholders.  In opposing those submissions, 
the Committee reiterated their concerns expressed in the earlier report.3 
c) The current level of Trans-Tasman Investment 
There may have been some merit in the fear of tax havens when imputation 
was first introduced in 1989.  The recent corporate migration of Brierley 
Investments Limited (BIL) to Singapore, and the simultaneous tax migration to 
Bermuda, demonstrates that these concerns are only valid so long as there is a 
significant New Zealand owned shareholding in the relevant company.  
Another well known example of the futility of this approach, is the recent 
migration by Lion Breweries to Australia following the “take-over” by Kirin 
Breweries. 
 
Furthermore, the level of trans-Tasman investment has changed significantly 
since 1989.  The BNZ was sold by the then Government to NAB in the early 
1990’s.  Other former government departments or state owned enterprises 
(SOE’s) such as Air New Zealand and Telecom have made significant 
investments in Australian companies, along with public companies such as 
Lion Nathan, Goodman Fielder Wattie, Tasman Properties, etc.  The recent 
                                            
2 p 33-34, para 3.2.3-3.2.4 
3 “The imputation system and the international tax reforms need to be mutually consistent and reinforcing.  A non-
resident company could avoid the international tax regime by holding its non-New Zealand interests through a 
non-resident subsidiary.  This advantage would be counterbalanced in part if such a company were not able to pass 
imputation credits through to its New Zealand shareholders.  For this reason, the Committee does not favour 
allowing non-resident companies to allocate credits to New Zealand resident shareholders” (para 4.2.2-4.2.3). 
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demutalisation of the insurance industry has left a significant number of 
individual New Zealand shareholders with investments in trans-Tasman 
insurance companies like AXA, Tower Corporation and AMP. 
d) Summary 
What this brief summary of the current imputation and international tax 
regimes shows is that triangular taxation is not an accident of history.  The 
members of various Consultative Committees which were responsible for 
designing the main parameters were clearly aware that one of the consequences 
of their decisions would be the creation of the triangular tax problem. 
 
They were for example concerned about companies such as BIL taking 
advantage of any attempt to accommodate trans-Tasman companies and their 
domestic shareholders.  However, that corporate horse has already bolted and 
there would seem to be little point in trying to keep that stable door shut. 
 
OVERVIEW OF THE PROPOSED SOLUTION 
a) Pro rata allocation 
After considering a number of alternative options (discussed later in the article) 
the two governments have settled on a relief mechanism known as “pro rata 
allocation”.  Under this solution, trans-Tasman companies can distribute both 
New Zealand imputation credits and Australian franking credits.  Both types of 
credit must be distributed across all shareholders, as opposed to those 
shareholders who would derive the maximum benefit from the available 
credits. 
b) Commencement date 
If the proposed mechanism is adopted, it will mean that trans-Tasman 
companies will be required to operate memorandum accounts in both 
jurisdictions which would record imputation and franking credits.  Under the 
proposal a company distributing a dividend will be required to attach both 
imputation and franking credits, even though a New Zealand resident 
shareholder could only use the imputation credit.   
 
Clearly this will require trans-Tasman companies to change their existing 
accounting and information systems.  Accordingly, the proposal would apply 
no earlier than the New Zealand imputation year commencing on 1 April 2003.  
Imputation and franking credits will only arise in respect of tax paid on or after 
that date.   
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c) Conceptual basis of pro rata allocation 
The discussion document notes that this method of providing triangular relief 
was the preferred approach of both governments.  The conceptual basis of the 
joint governmental approach is that pro rata allocation was the only method 
that apportioned the underlying tax benefits based on the shareholder’s 
ownership in a way which was consistent with both countries current policy on 
imputation.  The conceptual basis of pro rata allocation is the proposition that 
trans-Tasman shareholders merely have a right to a proportion of the total 
income derived by their company, as opposed to a specific source of income 
derived by that company.  For example, an individual New Zealand resident 
shareholder is not entitled to receive a dividend sourced from the underlying 
net income derived by the New Zealand subsidiary described in diagram 1 and 
table 1 above.   
 
In the context of the available imputation and franking credits, this principle 
suggests that the credit allocation mechanism should require a trans-Tasman 
company that pays a dividend to its trans-Tasman shareholders to attach the 
same proportion of each type of credit to that dividend.  Accordingly, the total 
New Zealand and Australian tax imposed on the respective shareholders will be 
consistent with their proportionate share of each source of income derived by 
the parent company.   
 
The examples contained in the discussion document reflect this principle 
because the dividend that is distributed to the trans-Tasman shareholders is 
partly generated from Australian income with Australian tax paid on that 
income.  Accordingly, it would be inconsistent with the imputation regimes of 
both countries if the dividend derived by an individual New Zealand 
shareholder merely contained imputation credits with the corresponding 
franking credits allocated solely to the Australian shareholders.   
ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS 
a) Compliance Costs 
The discussion document acknowledges that the pro rata allocation method 
does not from an individual shareholder’s perspective provide the optimal 
solution.  This conclusion is based on the fact that only a proportion of the tax 
paid in each country is available to the resident shareholders of that country.   
 
Secondly, the proposed solution will result in additional compliance costs for 
any company that elects to adopt the proposal.  For example, the Australian 
parent company, described in Diagram 1 and Table 1, will be required to 
maintain an additional memorandum account which would track the imputation 
credits generated in New Zealand and the attachment of those credits to any 
dividend paid to its trans-Tasman shareholders.  Unless there are significant 
additional tangible benefits associated with the pro rata allocation method, it is 
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highly unlikely that an Australian parent company would be prepared to accept 
the inevitable additional compliance costs.  One method of measuring the 
relationship between the additional tax advantages and the inevitable 
compliance costs, is to contrast the tax consequences of the alternative methods 
that were rejected by both governments.   
b) The optimal solution 
The pro rata model is not the optimal tax solution.  From a company and 
shareholder perspective, the streaming of tax credits would provide significant 
additional benefits that are not available under the pro rata allocation method.  
If this alternative were adopted, then the Australian parent company and its 
New Zealand subsidiary would attach imputation credits to any dividend 
distributed to the New Zealand resident shareholders.  Those shareholders 
would not receive a proportion of the available franking credits.  Accordingly, 
the streaming of credits model does not result in any wastage, that is to say the 
misallocation of either imputation or franking credits. 
 
There were three other alternatives which both governments considered but 
rejected.  They were: 
?? Mutual recognition (including pro rata revenue sharing). 
?? Apportionment. 
?? Streaming. 
c) Mutual recognition 
Under this theoretical alternative, there are two possible solutions.  The first 
would involve providing imputation/franking credits for the company tax paid 
in the other jurisdiction.  The second method would involve extending the full 
benefits of, for example, imputation to individual shareholders resident in 
Australia.  This would be done on a reciprocal basis.   
 
In addition, compensation could be paid to the country that recognised the 
imputation credit from the country that received the company tax which created 
the credit.   
 
Under this solution, the New Zealand government would recognise, as a New 
Zealand imputation credit, a franking credit that was attached to a dividend 
derived by a New Zealand individual shareholder, and vice versa.  Under this 
solution the New Zealand government, as the resident country, would bear the 
cost of recognising the Australian franking credit.  Accordingly, compensation 
could become payable to the country that recognised the imputation credit 
(New Zealand) from the country that received the tax which generated the 
franking credit (Australia).  If this feature did not form a part of this solution, it 
would mean that the cost of the franking credit would be borne by New 
Zealand (the country of residence).   
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At the end of each income year, there would be a wash-up calculation and 
payment. The two revenue authorities would calculate the total credits claimed 
by their respective taxpayers and one country would pay to the other the net 
imbalance.  For example, if the New Zealand government had recognised 
$100m in Australian imputation credits, and the Australian government had 
recognised $50m in New Zealand imputation credits, then the Australian 
government would pay to the New Zealand government $50m.   
 
From the perspective of an individual New Zealand residence shareholder, this 
method would involve each country recognising the other country’s imputation 
credits as if they were its own, but in turn receiving compensation from the 
other government.  This theoretical solution was rejected by both governments 
because mutual recognition exceeds what was required to solve triangular 
taxation.  One of the main conceptual concerns was that shareholders in either 
country would receive imputation credits, regardless of whether tax was paid in 
their respective home countries. 
“Neither government is willing, therefore, to pursue mutual 
recognition further at this stage.”4   
d) Apportionment 
This theoretical solution is similar to pro rata allocation except that the 
imputation credits are allocated in proportion to the residence of the 
shareholder and in proportion to the country in which the income was earned.  
Under the pro rata allocation solution, the credits do not reflect the sources of 
the underlying income of the parent company.   
 
If the hypothetical parent company in Diagram 1 and Table 1 earned 50% of its 
income from sources in Australia and 50% of its income from its New Zealand 
subsidiary, the shareholders would receive 50% of a full Australian imputation 
credit and 50% of a full New Zealand imputation credit.  The solution would be 
advantageous to the hypothetical New Zealand individual resident shareholders 
who do not receive any of the New Zealand imputation credits.  However, it 
would create a significant disadvantage to the resident Australian shareholders 
who currently receive a fully franked dividend from the Australian parent 
company.  Accordingly, this theoretical solution is unlikely to find any support 
from an Australian parent company with a significant Australian individual 
shareholding. 
 
Secondly, this method was rejected because it is inconsistent with the current 
imputation regime of both countries, which provide that imputation/franking 
credits must be allocated across all shareholders.  Thirdly, the current regimes 
do not recognise different sources of income that are contained in a dividend 
distribution.   
                                            
4 Joint Discussion Document p15. 
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e) Streaming 
Under this alternative, all tax paid by the hypothetical Australian parent 
company would be allocated to the Australian shareholders whereas the tax 
paid by the New Zealand subsidiary would be allocated solely to the New 
Zealand shareholders in the Australian parent company.  From a trans-Tasman 
shareholders perspective, this is the optimal solution because it does not 
involve the wastage or misallocation of a proportion of the available imputation 
and franking credits and is therefore superior to the proposed pro rata solution.  
It would appear from the discussion document that both governments rejected 
this alternative because they did not wish to signal that the streaming of 
available credits was becoming more acceptable.5  One of the four design 
features of both country’s imputation regimes which have not altered since 
their introduction, is the principle that credits must be allocated equally to all 
shareholders irrespective of their ability to utilise the credit.  For example, a 
shareholder on a marginal rate of 19.5 who receives an imputation credit of $33 
is not able to effectively utilise the surplus imputation credit, unless they have 
alternative sources of unimputed income.   
AN EXAMPLE OF THE PRO RATA ALLOCATION METHOD 
a) A hypothetical example 
The example below is based on an example in the discussion document.  For 
simplicity, this example assumes a 30% tax rate in both Australia and New 
Zealand.  Aust Co earns Australian source income, and receives a dividend 
from its wholly owned New Zealand subsidiary.   This example is based on an 
Australian parent company that owns a wholly owned New Zealand subsidiary.  
Aust Co is owned by Australian and New Zealand individual shareholders.  
The shareholding is owned 50% by each class of shareholder.  Aust Co earns 
$2,500 of Australian source income, and receives $1,050 dividend from its 
New Zealand subsidiary.  For the purposes of illustration the effective tax rate 
in both countries is assumed to be 30%.  Finally Aust Co has a 50% 
distribution policy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
5 Joint Discussion Document p16 para 3.27 
Australian 
shareholder 
New Zealand 
shareholder 
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 $700 Cash $700 Cash 
 $300 Franking credits 50% 50% $300 Franking credits 
 $225 Imputation credits   $225 Imputation credits 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  62.5%  37.5% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diagram 2 
 
b) Recording the tax consequences 
Aust Co’s memorandum accounts will record as follows: 
 
 Franking Account Imputation Account 
 Dr Cr Bal Dr Cr Bal 
Tax paid  $750 $750  $450 $450 
Dividend to Aust shareholder $300   $225   
Dividend paid to NZ shareholder  $300  $150 $225  $0 
Table 2 
 
 
Under the current distribution rules, Aust Co is only able to attach Australian 
franking credits to the dividend paid to both the Australian and New Zealand 
shareholders.  However, the 50% New Zealand shareholders are not able to 
effectively utilise the franking credits.  Secondly, the available imputation 
credit cannot be used by either group of shareholders. 
 
Under the pro rata allocation solution, Aust Co could attach imputation credits 
to the hypothetical dividend.  The imputation credits must be attached in 
proportion to the shareholder.  Accordingly, the dividend could have both a 
franking credit and an imputation credit and consequently could be both fully 
franked and fully imputed. 
Aust Income $2,500 
Aust tax $   750 
Net income $1,750 
NZ Income $1,500 
NZ tax $   450 
Net income $1,050 
Aust Parent Co 
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c) The shareholder’s perspective 
The tax treatment for the New Zealand shareholder in the above example 
before and after the proposed reform is illustrated in the following table: 
 
 Before reform Pro rata allocation 
Cash dividend $700 $700 
Imputation credits Nil $225 
Franking credit Nil $300 
Gross income $700 $925 
Tax due @ 39% $273 $361 
Imputation credits Nil $225 
Franking credit Nil Nil 
Tax payable $273 $136 
Net dividend $427 $564 
Effective tax rate 57.3% 43.6% 
Table 3 
 
This table is designed to illustrate two key features.  Although the New Zealand 
shareholder will receive an imputation and franking credit, they can only use 
the imputation credit to offset against their personal income tax liability.  From 
a New Zealand shareholder’s perspective the franking credit is of no value.   
 
The second key point to note is the impact caused by the 50% Australian 
shareholding in Aust Co.  The New Zealand shareholders are only entitled to 
receive 50% of the available imputation credits.  In this example, there are 
insufficient imputation credits to fully impute the dividend.  Under the full 
streaming option, it would be possible for Aust Co to pay to its 50% New 
Zealand shareholders a fully imputed dividend.6  The inability of Aust Co to 
pay a fully imputed divided to its New Zealand shareholders explains why the 
effective rate of tax is 43.6% and not 39%.  From a tax policy perspective, both 
governments believe this is the correct outcome because the dividend was 
partly generated by Australian source income which naturally were not subject 
to New Zealand corporate tax.  Whilst it is true that the pro rata allocation 
method does provide an improvement in the after tax return of a New Zealand 
individual shareholder, it is not (from the shareholder’s perspective) the 
optimal solution.   
d) Additional key points 
There are a number of additional key points which are not reflected in the 
above tables and diagrams.  These include the following features. 
 
(1) Flow through mechanism 
                                            
6 Section ME 8(1) of the Income Tax Act 1996 (the Act) provides that the maximum imputation credit which can 
be attached to a dividend assuming that the company tax rate is 30%, is 30/70 or 0.4285 of the cash dividend. 
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The proposed tracking account summarised above, would enable Aust Co to 
record the payment of New Zealand and Australian company tax, and record 
the allocation of the available tax credits to dividends paid to shareholders.  In 
the case of an ultimate parent company which proposes to distribute tax paid by 
a lower tier company (which may or may not constitute a wholly owned 
subsidiary) it will be necessary for the lower tier company to pay a dividend 
with the available credit attached.  This flow through mechanism is consistent 
with the current requirements under both the New Zealand and Australian 
existing legislation. 
 
(2) Creditable taxes 
The discussion document contains a significant change to the existing rules.  
Creditable taxes will, for the first time, also include non resident withholding 
tax (NRWT) paid in either jurisdiction.  For example, if a royalty is paid by the 
New Zealand subsidiary to the Australian parent company NRWT must be 
deducted in New Zealand.  Under the proposal, Australian companies which 
maintain an imputation account will be permitted to credit New Zealand 
withholding tax on interest, royalties, dividends, and non resident contractors 
withholding tax.  However, approved issuer levies will not be creditable to the 
company’s imputation account because it is a liability of the New Zealand 
resident borrower. 
 
The converse will apply to a New Zealand company which maintains a 
franking account.  Franking credits for dividends, interest, and royalty 
withholding tax will amount to an extension of the current Australian franking 
credit regime.   
 
(3) Compliance issues 
There will be additional compliance costs for New Zealand and Australian 
companies which elect to enter the pro rata allocation proposal.  They will have 
to become familiar with the imputation rules of the other jurisdiction and 
comply with that country’s administrative requirements.  This could become a 
significant issue.  For example, the recent Australian changes to the definition 
of “debt” and “equity” mean that instruments which from a New Zealand 
perspective are eligible for imputation credits may not be eligible for franking 
in Australia.  An example of this type of asymmetrical treatment is redeemable 
preference shares which will often not be eligible for franking in Australia. 
 
Additional compliance costs will arise from differences between each country’s 
domestic law.  For example, the provisions relating to shareholder continuity in 
New Zealand, exempting companies in Australia, benchmark dividends and 
anti-streaming rules, contain a number of subtle but significant differences.  
Finally, the dividend statements provided to shareholders will require 
amendments to incorporate the respective imputation and franking credit which 
were previously not disclosed. Accordingly, it is anticipated that any company 
which elects to adopt the pro rata allocation solution will only do so if the 
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benefits of the additional tax saving outweigh the inevitable additional 
administrative and compliance costs stuff. 
 
(4) Foreign currency issues 
In the above hypothetical example, the new tracking account of the parent 
company (Aust Co) will have to be maintained in New Zealand dollars.  
Secondly, there are various implications at the shareholder level associated 
with the conversion of the available credit from its base currency into the other 
country’s currency.  The discussion document contains a detailed appendix 
which outlines three possible options to deal with the problems created by 
changes in the exchange rate.  It is highly likely that the exchange rate on the 
day a dividend is declared, will be different from the prevailing exchange rate 
on the day the underlying company tax was paid.  How should the inevitable 
difference be reconciled?   
 
WILL THE REFORMS WORK? 
a) Introduction 
The pro rata allocation proposal is not the optimal solution (see below).  
Accordingly it is difficult to predict the extent to which an individual New 
Zealand and Australian shareholder will benefit.  The impact of the proposal 
will depend on a case by case analysis of the following variables. 
b) The dilutionary effect 
The hypothetical example analysed above clearly demonstrates that only a 
proportion of the tax paid is available for distribution.  Only 50% of any tax 
paid in New Zealand is available for distribution to the New Zealand 
shareholders.  However, if the streaming option was implemented, all of the tax 
paid in New Zealand would be available as a credit against the individual New 
Zealand shareholder’s personal liability.   
 
There are two key drivers that will determine the benefit an investor will obtain 
from these reforms: 
 
· the dividend distribution policy of the distributing company;  and 
· the percentage of income derived by that company from the 
investor’s home jurisdiction 
There will be additional tax leakage if the percentage of profits distributed 
exceeds the percentage of profits derived in a particular jurisdiction.  As a 
general rule where the percentage of profits distributed is equal to the 
percentage of profits received from the other jurisdiction, shareholders should 
receive a fully imputed dividend.  However, in situations where the percentage 
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of profits distributed is significantly higher than the percentage of profits 
received from the other jurisdiction, shareholders in the other jurisdiction will 
only receive partially imputed dividends. 
 
The application of this principle is graphically demonstrated in the hypothetical 
example analysed above.  It is not possible for the Australian parent company 
to distribute a fully imputed dividend to its New Zealand shareholders because 
of the imbalance in the mix of income reflected in that dividend.   
c) Complexity of the proposed Rules 
Unless there are significant financial benefits to the individual shareholders, an 
Australian company is unlikely to adopt this method simply because it will 
improve the after tax return of its New Zealand shareholders.  A major 
disincentive is the complexity of the proposed rules and the requirement for the 
Australian company to maintain an additional memorandum account which 
satisfies all of the New Zealand requirements of its imputation regime.   
 
Furthermore, there is an additional complication arising from the relationship 
between the way in which relief from NRWT is provided by the respective 
countries.  Australia exempts a fully franked dividend from Australian NRWT.  
However, New Zealand has adopted a complex method known as the foreign 
investor tax credit regime (FITC).  Under this approach, the foreign shareholder 
receives a supplementary dividend that is equal to the NRWT which is payable.  
The advantage of this approach is that it increases the non resident 
shareholder’s available tax credit in the country of residence.   
 
It is not clear from the discussion document how the FITC regime will interact 
with the calculation of imputation credits which will become available to an 
Australian company that carries on business in New Zealand via a subsidiary. 
 
One possible way of eliminating any complexity caused by the FITC regime, 
would be to negotiate a protocol to the New Zealand/Australian double tax 
agreement (DTA) which recognises the close relationship between the two 
countries.  The protocol would provide for the elimination of withholding taxes 
on dividend flows between the two countries.  An international precedent for 
this proposal is the recently concluded Australia/United States DTA.  
 
The combined effect of the reduction in imputation credits associated with the 
pro rata mechanism, coupled with the complexity and related compliance costs 
associated with adopted the proposal, will limit its appeal.  An Australian 
company that carries on business via a New Zealand subsidiary is not going to 
be encouraged to adopt these proposals if there are only a small number of New 
Zealand shareholders which could conceivably benefit.  In that scenario, any 
benefit to the Australian company is marginal and the Australian parent 
company could well find that the compliance costs exceed any benefit. 
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VIII.  FULL STREAMING 
a) Introduction 
Table 4 illustrates the operation of the streaming model from the perspective of 
an individual New Zealand shareholder.  They key point to note is that no 
credits are wasted because all of the imputation credits are attached solely to 
the dividend distributed to individual New Zealand shareholders.  The converse 
applies in the case of dividends paid to individual Australian resident 
shareholders who receive all of the available franking credits.  
 
 Before reform Pro rata allocation Full streaming 
Cash dividend $700 $700 $700 
Imputation credits Nil $225 $345 
Franking credit Nil $300 $Nil 
Gross income $700 $925 $1,045 
Tax due @ 39% $273 $361 $408 
Imputation credits Nil $225 $345 
Franking credit Nil Nil Nil 
Tax payable $273 $136 $(63) 
Net dividend $427 $564 $637 
Effective tax rate 57.3% 43.6% 39% 
Table 4 
The streaming model is superior to the pro rata allocation alternative, because it 
provides the maximum benefit to both groups of shareholders and therefore 
achieves the underlying objective of ensuring that tax is not paid twice on the 
same income.   
b) Why was this model rejected? 
The discussion document summarises7 the three primary reasons why both 
governments have rejected the streaming alternative.   
 1 The first reason is the perception that the streaming 
model provides tax benefits that are disproportionate to 
the individual shareholder’s interest in the company.   
 2 The second is perception that this alternative contains a 
fiscal risk because all of the available imputation credits 
could be used to reduce an individual shareholder’s 
New Zealand tax liability. 
                                            
7 Pages 16-17, paragraphs 3.25-3.27. 
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 3 A concern that the adoption of the streaming model 
could be interpreted as a signal that streaming is now an 
acceptable strategy. 
 
A careful examination of the history of New Zealand’s international tax regime 
and the underlying objectives of the imputation regime strongly suggests that 
there is very little merit (if any) in the joint government’s concerns.   
 
c) Disproportionate benefits 
 
1. The discussion document 
The joint government’s government concern is  
“Streaming would see all tax paid in New Zealand available to 
provide imputation credits solely to New Zealand shareholders.  
Such a model is contrary to Australia and New Zealand’s imputation 
rules as it provides tax benefits to shareholders disproportionate to 
their shareholding.”8 
 
2.  Maximum imputation ratio 
This is not a substantial reason for rejecting the streaming model.  Under this 
model Australian Co is restricted by the amount of imputation credit which it 
can attach to the dividend.  Based on the current corporate tax rate of 33% the 
current ratio is 33/67.  It is therefore not possible for the New Zealand 
shareholders to receive an imputation credit which exceeds the tax paid by the 
New Zealand operating subsidiary to the New Zealand revenue authority.   
 
3. A minor distinction 
The only difference between the pro rata and streaming models is that the 
parent company has a choice under the streaming model of allocating either a 
franking or imputation credit to its respective shareholders.  The objective of 
the streaming model is to eliminate the incidence of double taxation on income 
sourced from the country in which the shareholder is a tax resident.  This 
laudable objective is entirely consistent with the objectives of the New Zealand 
and Australian imputation regimes which were introduced to eliminate double 
taxation.  The point which has been overlooked in the discussion document is 
that New Zealand corporate tax is distributed to New Zealand resident 
shareholders.  There is no attempt to ensure that an individual New Zealand 
shareholder obtains a credit for Australian company tax in respect of income 
which was not previously taxed in New Zealand.   
 
                                            
8 Page 10, paragraph 3.25. 
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d) Fiscal risks 
 
1. The discussion document 
The fiscal concerns of the governments are difficult to understand. 
Both governments, however, are concerned about the fiscal risks of 
such a model, given that imputation credits would be allocated only 
to shareholders of countries in which the tax was paid.  This means 
that most of the imputation credits allocated could be used to reduce 
the shareholder’s home country tax liabilities.9 
 
2. An anomaly in the current law 
Both governments are incorrect in their understanding of the streaming model 
because it will only offset a resident shareholder’s domestic tax liability to the 
extent that underlying corporate tax was paid in that country.  When viewed 
from this perspective it is difficult to see how the streaming model could ever 
pose a material threat to the New Zealand tax base.  The streaming model 
merely alleviates the wastage of credits which occur under the current 
imputation regime.  The streaming model merely rectifies a deficiency in the 
current law which is not putting the tax base at risk.  By correcting an anomaly 
in the existing law will ensure that there is consistent treatment between a 
domestic investment and a triangular investment.   
 
3.  An international perspective 
At the international level, this model merely streams the available tax credits to 
the domestic shareholders in the country in which the underlying corporate tax 
was paid.  It does not stream foreign tax credits to shareholders at different 
rates.  The existing anti streaming provisions in both domestic tax systems will 
still apply thereby preventing any attempt to stream the domestic tax credits.   
e) Inconsistent with anti-streaming rules 
 
1. The discussion document10 
The third and final concern of both governments was that to allow streaming in 
the context of triangular taxation: 
 
“Might also signal that streaming of credits more generally is not 
acceptable.  Both governments wish to avoid such a result, as it is still 
both country’s policy that imputation credits should not be streamed 
and should be allocated across all shareholders.”11 
It is clear that the streaming model is not inconsistent with the imputation 
regime.  The report of the original committee which considered the design 
                                            
9 Page 16, paragraph 3.26. 
10 Page 16, paragraph 3.27. 
11 Report of the Consultative Committee on Full Imputation (April 1988) at page 53. 
 
 
20 
parameters of the current imputation regime noted that from an imputation 
policy perspective, there were no policy reasons to prevent the streaming of 
credits in the case of triangular taxation.  For the reasons discussed earlier in 
this article, the committee rejected the streaming option because of their 
concern that it could underline the CFC and FIF regimes.  The current anomaly 
merely reflects the historical imperative that major New Zealand corporates 
such as BIL, should not be in a position to stream imputation credits arising 
from New Zealand source income to domestic New Zealand shareholders.  If 
that were to occur it could have provided BIL with an incentive to trap offshore 
income in a CFC, thereby avoiding the impact of those two regimes (which 
were also introduced at the time of imputation). 
 
2. New Zealand’s anti avoidance rule 
There are a number of significant provisions in New Zealand domestic law 
which would prevent the inappropriate use of the streaming model thereby 
alleviating this concern. 
 
 a) The current imputation regime has numerous provisions which are 
designed to prevent streaming.  The first is a restriction against 
attaching imputation credits to dividends which exceed the maximum 
imputation ratio (i.e. 33/67).  This rule ensures that a company cannot 
distribute a dividend that exceeds the rate of company tax.   
 
 b) The benchmark dividend rule.  This test ensure that all distributions 
contain the same imputation ratio (subject to a ratio change 
declaration).   
 
 c) A continuity of shareholding test.  A company cannot carry forward 
and imputation credit balance where there is a greater than 34% change 
in shareholding.  In other words, a company must maintain at least a 
66% continuity of shareholding. 
 
 d) Specific rules that prohibit the trading of shares where a purpose (not 
being an incidental purpose) of the arrangement is to provide a tax 
advantage to any shareholder.  Those provisions are designed to 
prevent shareholders from buying and selling shares to facilitate the 
passing of imputation credits to shareholders who are best able to 
utilise them. 
 
3. Australian anti avoidance rules 
 a) The Australian legislation contains a number of similar provisions.  
The maximum franking ratio in Australia is 30/70.   
 
 b) The forty-five day holding period requires a shareholder who wishes to 
qualify for any franking benefits to have held those shares at risk for at 
least forty-five days prior to the receipt of a franking benefit. 
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 c) Specific rules that are designed to prevent a company from introducing 
different classes of shares which in substance are identical.  This rule is 
designed to prevent the streaming of franking credits to different legal 
categories of shareholder. 
 
 d) A benchmark dividend rule which provides that any subsequent 
dividend paid within a six month period must not depart from that ratio 
by more than 20%.   
 
4. For all of these reasons it is difficult to see why the adoption of the 
streaming model would give rise to any genuine tax based maintenance 
issues.  The existing rules in both jurisdictions are adequate to prevent the 
disproportionate allocation of credits.   
 
DOUBLE TAX TREATY ISSUES 
a) The model convention 
There is clearly a joint New Zealand Australian political commitment to 
improving the position.  To what extent (if any) will the ultimate legislative 
solution reflect New Zealand existing double tax treaty network.   
The OECD model tax convention does not provide any authoritative guidance 
on mutual recognition of imputation credits.  Whether or not the negotiating 
party should provide imputation credits to non resident shareholders of the 
other treaty country is left to the negotiation process. 
 
The commentary on article 10 (Taxation of Dividends) suggests there is no 
consensus on this topic.  Despite the absence of any clear guidance some 
European countries have granted bilateral relief to non resident shareholders.  
In the Asia Pacific region there is the Malaysian-Singapore experience. 
 
However none of these treaty solutions go anywhere as far, either the pro rata 
allocation model, or the full streaming option. 
b) International precedents 
 
1) The United Kingdom imputation system 
According to Harris12 all dividends paid by United Kingdom companies are 
prima facie taxable in the hands of all shareholders including non residents. 
Prior to April 1999, imputation credits were available to non residents under 
numerous United Kingdom double tax treaties. The treaty partner shareholders 
                                            
12 Peter A Harris “Corporate Shareholder Income Taxation and Allocating Taxing Rights between Countries:  A 
Comparison of Imputation Systems” IBFD Publications BU (1996) pp787-788. 
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were entitled to a refund of imputation credits attached to dividends less 
NRWT at 15% of the grossed up dividend.  In some cases the imputation credit 
was only available to portfolio shareholders and in other instances it was 
limited to individual shareholders. 
 
In the case of the New Zealand United Kingdom double tax agreement, Article 
11 provides that the United Kingdom can impose tax at the rate of 15% on the 
gross dividend (including the “imputation” credit, i.e. ACT which was the 
position up until the repeal of ACT in April 1999.).  An individual resident 
New Zealand shareholder is also entitled to a cash refund. 
 
2)  Malaysia and Singapore  
Harris13 contains a useful summary of the Malaysia-Singapore double taxation 
agreement.  In his discussion of the Malaysian imputation system, Harris notes 
that: 
“Where Malaysian companies distribute income derived from 
Singapore, they may declare themselves resident in Singapore for the 
purposes of such distribution.  Accordingly, Malaysian companies are 
subject to Singapore’s equivalent of s108 of ITA 1967 with respect to 
such distributions and Singapore shareholders are entitled to Singapore 
dividend tax credits.” 
 
In his discussion of Singapore’s imputation system, Harris notes that: 
 
“The Malaysian treaty is again worthy of special mention.  Under that 
treaty, where Singapore companies distribute income derived from 
Malaysia, they may declare themselves resident in Malaysia for the 
purpose of such distribution. Accordingly, Singapore companies are 
subject to Malaysia’s equivalent of s44 of ITWA with respect to such 
distributions and Malaysian shareholders are entitled to Malaysian 
dividend tax credits.” 
 
3)  Bilateral Issues 
Another issue which businesses, policymakers, and politicians must take into 
account is whether there are any bilateral DTA constraints which would enable 
other treaty countries to also enjoy the benefits of any trans-Tasman solution.  
This is an important question because the risk of having to provide similar 
benefits to the residents of other countries could undermine the latest initiative 
to devise a trans-Tasman solution. 
 
 
 
 
                                            
13 Ibid p 682, pp 748-749. 
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c) Non-discrimination clauses 
 
1. Introduction 
Irrespective of whatever emerges as the final solution, a potential barrier would 
be any existing bilateral DTA article which would enable a third party treaty 
country to enjoy the benefits of the ultimate legislative solution.  This could 
conceivably occur due to non-discrimination and/or most favoured nation 
clauses in existing DTA. 
 
2. Article 24 of the OECD convention 
The non-discrimination clause in the OECD model is contained in article 24.  
New Zealand has reserved its position on the non-discrimination article.14  
However New Zealand has agreed to include a non-discrimination article in the 
following DTAs.  Generally speaking, it is based on article 24 of the OECD 
model. 
?? China (article 24) 
?? Denmark (article 22A) 
?? Finland (article 23A) 
?? India (article 24) 
?? Ireland (article 25) 
?? United Kingdom (article 23) 
?? United States (article 23) 
 
3.  Paragraph 1 of article 24 
Article 24(1) provides that residents of the other country shall not be subjected 
in New Zealand to any taxation which is more burdensome than the taxation 
requirements to which New Zealand residents in the same circumstances are 
subjected to. 
 
If article 24(1) is read literally, then it could never apply to either solution.  In 
the case of a resident of, for example China or India, it would only apply if 
those residents were also a tax resident of New Zealand.  Article 24(1) does not 
require New Zealand to apply the trans-Tasman solution to tax residents of 
other treaty countries. 
 
4. Paragraph 3 of Article 24 
In the present context article 24(3) provides that the taxation of a permanent 
establishment which an enterprise of, for example, China has in New Zealand 
shall not be less favourably taxed in New Zealand than the taxation levied on 
enterprises of New Zealand carrying on the same activities. 
 
The commentary makes it abundantly clear that this paragraph is not designed 
to extend the benefits of an imputation system to non resident shareholders. 
 
                                            
14 Note 2 of the commentary on Article 24. 
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“This provision and the discrimination which it puts an end to, relates 
to the taxation only of enterprises and not the persons owning or 
controlling their capital.”15  (Emphasis added) 
 
5. Paragraph 5 of Article 24 
This rule provides that enterprises of New Zealand, the capital of which is 
wholly or partly owned or controlled by residents of, for example, India, shall 
not be subjected in New Zealand to any taxation or any requirement which is 
more burdensome than the taxation and connected requirements to which other 
similar enterprises of New Zealand are subjected. 
 
If article 24(5) is read literally then it is unlikely to create any difficulties, 
because it only applies to discrimination directed against the New Zealand 
company.  It does not apply to any discrimination directed against the non 
resident shareholders of the New Zealand company.  A provision in New 
Zealand domestic law which denies imputation credit relief to a non resident is 
a shareholder issue, and is not related to the New Zealand resident company.  
The commentary to article 24(5) states that this paragraph only protects the 
enterprise and not the owners or controllers of its capital. 
 
“This paragraph forbids a contracting state to give less favourable 
treatment to an enterprise, the capital of which is owned or 
controlled, wholly or partly, directly or indirectly, by one or more 
residents of the other contracting state.  This provision, and the 
discrimination which it puts an end to, relates to the taxation only of 
enterprises and not to the person’s owning or controlling its capital. 
Its object therefore is to ensure equal treatment for taxpayers 
residing in the same state and not to subject foreign capital, in the 
hands of …  shareholders, to identical treatment to that applied to 
domestic capital.16 
 
6. The Position in Australia 
The only non discrimination article in Australia’s DTA network is contained in 
the Australia-USA treaty.  In 1985 Richard J Vann analysed the implications of 
article 23(1) in the context of the initial Australian proposal to introduce an 
imputation system based on the United Kingdom advanced corporation tax 
model.  He concluded that article 23 would not create any significant 
difficulties, because it only applies to discrimination directed at the entity and 
not against its shareholders.17 
 
                                            
15 Note 2 at paragraph 4 of the commentary on Article 24, p C(24)2. 
16 Note 2 at paragraph 57, p C(24)20. 
17 Taxation in Australia pp 468-479 at p 471. 
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d) Most favoured nation articles 
1. Introduction 
Both countries have agreed to renegotiate selected aspects of the existing 
double taxation agreement if either country subsequently grants another 
country a more favourable treatment of, inter alia, the taxation of dividends.  
These undertakings are commonly known as “a most favoured nation” clause. 
 
2. The OECD model convention 
Most favoured nation clauses are not often considered because there is no 
“most favoured nation” clause in the OECD model convention or in the 
accompanying commentary a DTA reflects a bilateral negotiation and the idea 
that the benefit of a subsequent negotiation should be automatically granted to 
an earlier treaty partner is a concept that does not sit easily with the principle of 
bilateral negotiations.  For this reason, most countries do not concede “most 
favoured nation” clauses in their DTA negotiations. 
 
3. New Zealand’s “most favoured” nation clauses 
In the context of dividends, New Zealand has conceded a “most favoured 
undertaking” in the following DTAs: 
?? Finland 
?? Italy 
?? Netherlands 
?? Norway 
?? Republic of South Korea 
?? Switzerland 
?? United States of America 
 
 
4. The NZ -US Treaty 
In terms of capital inflows, this is the most important.  In the context of 
triangular taxation the NZ-US “most favoured nation” clause only applies when 
the reduction in NRWT is contained in a future double tax convention.  The 
clause would only be triggered if the mechanism was incorporated as an 
amendment to the 1995 NZ-Australia DTA, which is unlikely to occur. 
PROFIT REPATRIATION STRATEGIES 
a) Introduction 
b) Floating a separate New Zealand subsidiary 
1. Introduction 
An obvious solution to the triangular taxation problem is for an Australian 
parent company to incorporate a special purpose New Zealand subsidiary 
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which pays a fully imputed dividend to the New Zealand shareholders (who 
previously held shares in the Australian parent company).  The most significant 
example of this strategy is the recent $800 million successful capital raising 
undertaken by Westpac in late 1999.   
Following the successful Westpac $800 million float, the ANZ Banking Group 
announced a similar proposal but it has yet to proceed. 
 
The Westpac $800 Million Share Issue 
As part of the capital raising exercise, Westpac obtained a binding product 
ruling from the Inland Revenue Department which inter alia stated that the 
proposed float did not contravene the specific anti imputation streaming 
provisions contained in the Act or the general anti avoidance provision.  The 
essential features of the proposal are summarised in Product Ruling BR PDR 
99/13.  They can be described in the following diagram: 
 
Australian Public
98.8%
Westpac  Australia
Westpac  Holding “Parent”
New Zea l and  
Branch retai l  network
100%
“Borrower” “Issuer”
Properties
100%
Transfer property
$250 mil l ion
New Zea land  Holders
1.2%
$800 mil l ion
Deposit /
Interest
100%
$800 mil l ion
Equity
Lease of  Propert ies/Rent
Swap
Diagram 3  :  W e s t p a c
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The diagram has used the notation discussed in the ruling. 
 
The commercial rationale for the float was the fact that Westpac carried on 
business as a branch which meant that New Zealand branch was unable to raise 
separate equity in New Zealand.  Furthermore, there were significant 
commercial and regulatory constraints associated with any proposal to transfer 
the current branch operations into a separate company.  The diagram 
summarises the relationship between the additional equity, and the existing 
branch retail operation.  The issuing company owns the properties that will be 
leased to the various Westpac branches and subsidiaries that conduct business 
in New Zealand.  The issuer will derive gross taxable rental income. 
The proceeds of the float were lent by the issuer to another member of the New 
Zealand group which produced gross interest income. 
A third source of taxable income arises from the swap entered into between the 
issuer and the retail branch network.  Under that agreement the issuer will 
receive a yield based on the dividend paid by Westpac Australia to its 
Australian shareholders.  The corresponding cash flow paid by the issuer will 
be funded from, inter alia, the interest earned from the loan, and the rental 
income. 
These transactions are designed to ensure that the issuer derives sufficient gross 
income and pays sufficient New Zealand company tax to distribute a fully 
imputed dividend to it New Zealand shareholders.  That dividend will equal the 
equivalent dividend paid by the parent company to its Australian shareholders. 
 
Key Taxation Issues to be Resolved 
The key taxation issue is whether payment of dividends constitute an 
imputation streaming arrangement.  The Act contains a number of specific anti 
avoidance provisions which are designed to prevent the streaming of 
imputation credits to those taxpayers who can most effectively utilise them. 
The two key anti-avoidance provisions are: 
?? Streaming of dividends (section GC 22); and 
?? Stapled stock arrangements (section GC 23). 
Since the issuer will pay dividends in New Zealand dollars to allow New 
Zealand holders to use imputation credits, both sections could potentially apply 
to the class of shares issued by New Co. 
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The ANZ share issue 
Shortly after Westpac announced its proposed share capital raising proposal, 
ANZ embarked on a similar scheme.  The following diagram is based on the 
information contained in product ruling BR PDR OO/14.18   
 
 
Australian
ANZ BankNew York Branch
New Zealand 
shareholders
ANZ Funds
ANZ Holdings
ANZ NZ
(g) forward sale (4) dividend
Unit trust
(c) variable
rate FCI 
debenturesN Z
ANZ Sub I
NZ
ANZ Sub II
(d) loan
(e) swap interest/dividends
(3) dividends
(2) swap payments/receipts
(f) variable rate
 debenture
forward sales agreements (g) 
Capital flows (a) to (f)  
Income (1) to (4) 
(a) Sale of
existing shares
(b) Invest proceeds
from (a) party in 
paid units
(1) Interest =
Parent dividend
New entities
Diagram 4
 
                                            
18 TIB Vol 13 (No 2) (February 2001) pp 12-21. 
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The commercial rationale was also to enable the New Zealand operations to 
raise additional Tier One capital.  The structure was designed to enable the 
ANZ Group to pay fully imputed dividends to its inter alia New Zealand 
shareholders.  Conceptually the arrangement has a similar tax effect to the 
Westpac solution.  However, there are significant operational differences 
between the two proposals.  Under the ANZ binding ruling, the additional 
capital will be raised via a special purpose trust (SPT).   
For New Zealand tax purposes the trust will be deemed to constitute a unit trust 
and accordingly, distributions are deemed to be dividends for New Zealand tax 
purposes.  Proceeds received by the SPT Trust from the issuing of units to New 
Zealand holders, will be used to subscribe for a variable rate FC 1 debenture 
which will be issued by a new ANZ entity described as ANZ sub one.  That 
entity will in turn loan the proceeds at the prevailing bank bill rate plus a 
margin to a second new entity described as ANZ sub two.  The final stage in 
the initial cash flow will involve ANZ sub two using the proceeds to purchase a 
variable rate debenture issued by the New York branch of the ultimate parent 
company, ANZ Australia.   
Periodic cash flows will follow the initial “capital transactions” which will 
ultimately result in the payment of a fully imputed dividend by the SPT Trust 
to the New Zealand holders.   The transactions between the SPT Trust, ANZ 
sub one, and ANZ sub two will create taxable income and corresponding 
imputation credits in New Zealand which will be attached to the deemed 
dividend paid by the SPT Trust to the New Zealand holders.   
The complexity in the above diagram in part reflects the forward sale 
agreements between the original entities and the SPT Trust.  The legal and 
commercial effect of the interrelated series of forward sale agreements was to 
ensure that the capital raised via the SPT was ultimately locked into the New 
Zealand operations.   
The swap agreement between ANZ sub one and ANZ sub two appears to 
achieve the same result as the Westpac swap, which is to ensure that the 
dividend paid by the ultimate Australian parent company to its Australian 
shareholders mirrors the dividend payment by the SPT to its New Zealand 
holders. 
Once again the same two key taxation issues arise namely the potential 
application of the anti avoidance provisions contained in sections GC 22 and 
GC 23.   
 
3. Anti Credit Streaming Rules 
Streaming of dividends involves companies or shareholders seeking to obtain a 
tax advantage either through: 
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?? An arrangement for the sale or disposition of shares (GC 22(1)(a)); 
or 
?? Streaming credits to those shareholders best able to use them (GC 
22(1)(b)). 
Unfortunately neither of the Binding Rulings explain why the IRD believe 
neither of these two provisions applied.  The following analysis is one possible 
interpretation. 
4. Section GC 22(1)(a) 
In order for there to be an arrangement for inter alia the issue of shares, all of 
the four separate criteria contained in section GC22(1)(a) must be satisfied. 
 
For the purposes of section GC22(1)(a) both the Westpac and ANZ structures 
prima facie satisfy the first two requirements: 
 
?? All shareholders can reasonably expect a dividend to be paid in respect 
of the New Zealand class of shares. 
?? The New Zealand issuer can reasonably expect that imputation credits 
will be attached to any dividends paid on the New Zealand class of 
shares. 
 
The third criterion is that the shareholder must be a party to an arrangement.19  
The ANZ and Westpac structures are clearly designed to benefit New Zealand 
resident shareholders, but does that mean they are automatically a party?  If 
they are a party, are they a party to an arrangement?  The term arrangement is 
defined in OB1 as any “contract, agreement, plan or understanding” whether 
enforceable or not, and all steps by which it is carried into effect. 
 
It is difficult to see how the mere subscription for shares by a passive investor 
pursuant to a public offer makes that shareholder a party to an agreement.  The 
passive shareholders were not a party to any contract or agreement because 
they had no right to any shares.  Nor are they a party to a plan or understanding.  
Clearly they knew nothing about the structure until it was announced in the 
newspapers etc. 
 
5. Section GC 22(1)(b) 
Subparagraph (b) contemplates a comparison of benefits, to ascertain whether 
one party will receive a higher credit and thus obtain a tax advantage.  Both 
Binding Rulings suggest this provision will not be breached because there will 
only be one class of share issued by the issuer.  Accordingly there is nothing to 
compare.  No comparison can be made between the impact on different groups 
of shareholders. 
 
                                            
19 Section GC 22(1)(a)(iii)(A) refers to a person who is a party to an arrangement that attracts an imputation credit 
to a dividend. 
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c) Equity Instruments 
Secondly a Westpac and ANZ solution will not be a suitable vehicle for the tax 
effective transfer to the Australian group of surplus New Zealand funds arising 
from  
?? One off tax free New Zealand sourced capital gains 
?? Debt pushed down into New Zealand. 
The following structure is designed to reduce the net tax cost to the Australian 
parent via the creation of an annual benefit of 6.5% calculated by reference to 
the annual interest cost.  This benefit can be increased via the use of excess 
imputation credits. 
 
The following diagram summarises the key parties and the sequence of 
transactions: 
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?? NZ Operating Co loans surplus funds to sister company NZ FinCo, 
?? NZ FinCo loans the surplus funds using a floating rate debenture 
(“FRD”) to a special purpose finance company which is a member of the 
Australian group, Aus FinCo, 
?? Aus FinCo would then lend the funds at interest to its present parent 
company to retire existing third party debt. 
The following table shows the overall tax saving to the Australian group.  It is 
important to note that on this occasion the net cost is borne by the ATO. 
 
 
Table 5 
 
FRD 10% 
Principal Sum 100m 
Australian interest @ 10% (10m) 
A  Gross Australian Tax Saving @ 30% 3m 
After Tax Cost 7m 
 
B  Australian NRWT @ 10%  (1m) 
NZ Gross Interest/Dividend 10m 
C  NZ Net FDWP (less NRWT)  (2.3m) 
D  NZ Net Tax on Interest (less NRWT)  Nil 
NZ Cash Available for Dividend  6.7m 
NZ NRWT @15% Including Supplementary Dividend nil 
NZ Cash Plus FDWP Credit for NRWT purposes 9.0m 
NZ NRWT @ 15%  1.350m 
Less NZ FDWP Credit (2.3m) 
E  Refund of Excess FDWP 0.950m 
 
Cash Dividend to Aus Parent 7.650m 
Tax (Cost) Benefit to Group 7.650m 
(A-B-C-D+E) 
 
d) Australian Capital Gains Tax 
 
1. Introduction 
One of the major differences between the two trans-Tasman tax systems is the 
absence in New Zealand of capital gains tax (“CGT”).  Australian introduced a 
comprehensive CGT in 1985. 
 
Everything else being equal, the Australian CGT regime represents an 
additional layer of Australian tax which would not create any imputation 
credits in New Zealand.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
33 
2. FCT v Lamesa20 
Consider the case of a New Zealand Parent Company who wishes to purchase a 
commercial property in Australia.  The New Zealand Parent believes the value 
of the building will double during the next 4 years.  Can it structure the 
acquisition and anticipated disposal in a way which reduces its prima facie 
exposure to Australian CGT. 
 
Insert Diagram 6  
 
The US entity was a limited partnership and it acquired the taxpayer Lamesa, 
which was a company incorporated in the Netherlands (Dutch Holding Co).  
Lamesa acquired an Australian company (Australian Holding Company first 
tier) called Australian Resources Limited (ARL).  ARL acquired another 
Australian company (second tier Australian company) called Australian 
Resources Mining Pty Ltd (ARM).  ARM made a successful on the market 
takeover (Target Co – third tier) of an Australian resource company known as 
Arimco NL (Arimco) which had as one of it’s wholly owned subsidiaries – 
Target Sub – fourth tier (a company called Arimco Mining Pty Ltd (Arimco 
Mining).  That company held valuable gold mining leases.   
 
Two years after the takeover, the group was offered to the public via the issuing 
of new capital which was quoted on the Australian stock exchange.  Lamesa 
made a profit in excess of $A200m from selling its stake in ARL (Australian 
Holding Company – first tier) in two tranches.  Lamesa accepted that the profit 
was part of its assessable income under the Australian Act.  However, it 
claimed the protection of the business profits article in the 
Australia/Netherlands DTA.  Its case was based on article 7 (business profits) 
which is based on the 1997 OECD model.  The facts in Lamesa clearly 
disclosed that the taxpayer (Dutch Holding Co) did not carry on business in 
Australia via a permanent establishment. 
 
3. Article 13 of Australia Netherlands DTA 
The Australia-Netherlands DTA is similar to the New Zealand-Australian 
DTA.  In both instances Article 7 contains the general rule that the country of 
source can only tax a resident of the other country if the resident has 
established a permanent establishment in the country of source.  In Lamesa, the 
ATO accepted that the Dutch company (Lamesa) had not created a PE in 
Australia.  Article 7(5) of the Australian-Netherlands DTA provides that any 
transaction falling within inter alia Article 13 is subject to tax in Australia (the 
source country).  Article 13(1) of the Australia-Netherlands DTA provides that 
income from the alienation of real property may be taxed in Australia.  It does 
not allow Australia to tax any gain arising from the sale of shares in a company 
whose assets include shares in a property owning company.  That is what 
                                            
20 36 ATR 589 
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occurred in Lamesa.  Neither the goldmining licenses, or the company which 
held them (Airmco Mining) were sold by Lamesa. 
 
 
4. The judgment in Lamesa 
The disposal mechanism consisted of Lamesa arranging for the Australian 
holding company to float its Australian share capital to the Australian public.  
The profit realised by Lamesa was approximately $200 million.  That gain 
would constitute assessable income if the transaction was caught by Article 13 
of the DTA.  The issue before the Federal Court was whether the assets owned 
by the initial target subsidiary could be treated as assets of the Australian 
holding company. 
 
The ATO primary submission was that the phrase “shares or comparable 
interests in a company” authorised a substance approach.  The corporate veil of 
the subsidiary companies which were interposed between Lamesa and the 
mining leases held by Airmco Mining should be lifted for tax purposes, thereby 
treating the mining leases as constituting the asset of ARL.  Under this 
interpretation Australia would have the primary taxing rights because the assets 
of the group were comprised “principally of direct interests in or over land” in 
Australian within the meaning of Article 13. 
 
The Federal Court was not prepared to construe the phrase “… the assets of 
which… ” as extending down the chain of subsidiaries to the mining leases.  
The phrase was given a literal meaning.  The assets of ARL (the Australian 
Holding Company) comprised of the 100% shareholding in ARM (the second 
tier company), and not the mining licences owned by Arimco Mining (the 
fourth tier company).   The Federal Court was clearly concerned about the 
implications of authorising a look through in situations where the ownership 
was not via a chain of 100% owned subsidiaries.   How would the ATO 
interpret this Article if, for example Lamesa had only owned 51% of the first 
tier company.  This was clearly a real possibility, because Lamesa had sold 
down its shareholding in two public floatation’s.   
 
“But it is equally possible as a matter of policy that the legislature 
chose to limit the assimilation in Art 13 of shares to reality only to one 
tier of companies so as to avoid the kinds of melancholy complication 
which arise where multitudinous tiers are involved and with potentially 
varying percentage ownership interests.    
…  
The degree of complexity required would, no doubt, depend upon 
whether the policy was to deal only with wholly owned subsidiaries on 
the one hand or whether it would be intended to extend to lesser 
percentage ownership.  While it will be recalled that in the 1994 year 
of income Lamesa held virtually 100 per cent of ARL, that was not the 
situation in 1996, by which time Lamesa held only 67.35%.  But what if 
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ARL had, instead of owning 100% of ARM, owned 75%.  Would the 
assimilation be intended to operate as a matter of policy?  What if the 
percentage ownership were 51%?  The same questions can be asked at 
other levels in the chain of ownership to which the facts of the present 
case relate21.” 
 
In view of the similarity of the relevant articles in the New Zealand-
Netherlands DTA, and the New Zealand Australian DTA Lamesa structures 
can be used on both sides of the Tasman. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The problem of triangular taxation is not an historical accident.  At the time 
both countries introduced their respective imputation regimes it would have 
been quite possible to have incorporated into current law the streaming model.  
The New Zealand government deliberately created the current problem because 
it was concerned about undermining the CFC and FIF regimes which 
commenced shortly after imputation.   
Prior to the release of the joint Discussion Document triangular taxation 
encouraged trans-Tasman companies to maximise the payment of home 
country tax at the expense of the other country’s revenue base.  Hybrid 
instruments such as FCI debentures, and treaty shopping techniques provided 
tax solutions to what is perceived to be an unfair trans-Tasman tax system.   
The ultimate solution is to incorporate a special purpose subsidiary in the other 
country which is designed to pay a full imputed dividend to the individual 
shareholder resident in that country.  Westpac Bank have successfully 
implemented a structure which achieves that objective. 
Will the pro rata allocation model stop or reduce the incentives for trans-
Tasman companies to devise “imputation efficient” tax structures.  The answers 
appears to be no.  Pro rata allocation contains no significant tangible tax 
benefits for individual Australian resident shareholders.  Accordingly there is 
little incentive for Australian corporates to implement a proposal which 
benefits a small minority of resident individual New Zealand shareholders.   
From the perspective of the New Zealand individual shareholder the benefit of 
pro rata allocation is dependent on the dividend distribution policy of the 
Australian company, and the mix of the underlying sources of income reflected 
I the dividend.   
The only positive thing which can be said about this proposal is that it 
represents an improvement over the current taxation regime.  To that extent, 
                                            
21 Note   page 598 Line 10 and Line 20 
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New Zealand resident individual shareholders will welcome the introduction of 
the pro rata allocation model.  However, it does result in a significant waste or 
misallocation of imputation and franking credits.  The only long term feasible 
solution is for both countries to introduce full streaming. 
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Diagram 6 
 
 
 
ANZ BR PDR 00/1422 
                                            
22 TIB Vol 13 No 2 (February 2001) pp 12-21. 
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Australian
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